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LIMITING THE AVAILABILITY OF INVERSE
CONDEMNATION AS A LANDOWNER'S
REMEDY FOR DOWNZONING
Zoning regulations often increase or decrease the value of real
estate. Landowners adversely affected by the enactment of a new
zoning ordinance or a change in an existing use classification have
occasionally sought judicial relief. Attempts to recoup the decline in
market value of property from the municipality, however, have been
generally unsuccessful.' A recent California decision, HFH, Ltd. v.
Superior Court,2 reaffirmed this result, rejecting the contention that
fairness compelled compensation for the atirtificial allocation of
economic windfalls and wipeouts by zoning.3
In HFH, plaintiffs4 contracted to purchase a parcel of land, then
zoned for agricultural purposes on condition that the seller would
procure commercial zoning for the parcel to permit the development of
a shopping center. The city of Cerritos rezoned the property for
commercial use,5 and plaintiffs purchased for $388,000.6 Thereafter the
i. See, e.g., Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520
(1976); Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311, 101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972);
Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo, 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967);
Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So.2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Gaebel v. Thornbury Twp., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 399, 303
A.2d 57 (1973).
2. 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 904
(1976).
3. A windfall is a substantial increase in the value of real property which is primarily
caused by action other than the owner's. A wipeout is a corresponding decrease in value.
Although zoning determinations often lead to windfalls (or wipeouts), in theory zoning
alone is insufficient to produce a windfall: "Property can be re-zoned for more intensive
use and not enjoy any windfall unless there is market demand for that use. Thus, while
one can conceptually separate windfalls caused by government from those caused by the
community, they are very hard to disentangle and measure." Hagman, A New Deal:
Trading Windfalls for Wipeouts, 40 PLANNING 9 (1974); See also note 48 and accompany-
ing text infra.
4. Plaintiffs were HFH, Ltd., a limited partnership, and Von's Grocery Company, a
Delaware corporation. Their individual suits, concerning the same parcel of property and
the same legal issues, were consolidated on appeal. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.
App. 3d 908, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436 (1974).
5. 15 Cal. 3d at 510, 542 P.2d at 239, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 367. A parcel map approved by
the city of Cerritos, the real party in interest, provided that the property could only be
used as part of an integrated shopping center development. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior
Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 908, 911, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436, 439 (1974).
6. 15 Cal. 3d at 511, 542 P.2d at 240, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368. The subject property
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city declared a moratorium on the use of the property7 and temporarily
reclassified it agricultural. 8 After the city amended its comprehensive
general plan,9 plaintiffs contracted to sell the subject property for
$400,000, conditioned on their procuring a commercial classification
for the tract. The planning commission rejected their application and
an appeal to the city council failed.' 0 The city council subsequently
zoned plaintiffs' property low density, single family residential, at the
same time zoning as commercial two other quadrants of the same
intersection abutting plaintiffs' land."
Plaintiffs then brought suit against the city seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief and damages in inverse condemnation. Plaintiffs al-
comprised approximately 5.8 unimproved acres. Von's acquired 2.7 acres for $150,000
with the requirement that all the 5.8 acres be committed to a joint commercial develop-
ment project. HFH purchased the remaining 3.1 acres for $238,000 and assumed the
obligation of the grantor to develop the property for shopping center purposes in
conjunction with Von's Grocery. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 908,
910-11, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436, 438-39 (1974).
7. The purpose of the moratorium was to prevent intensification of property use
while the city restudied its land use policies. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App.
3d 908, 911, 116 Cal. Rptr. 436, 439 (1974).
8. 15 Cal. 3d at 510, 542 P.2d at 239, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 367. During the years between
1966, when plaintiffs purchased the property, and 1971, when the moratorium was
imposed, plaintiffs had not developed or established a more intensive use of the land.
Plaintiffs did not allege that the moratorium interfered with their planned development of
the land, nor did they challenge the reclassification to agricultural use at the time it was
made.
The enactment of an interim zoning regulation (moratorium) to postpone for a reason-
able period of time the granting of any uses which may conflict with a prospective zoning
plan being studied or considered by a legislative body is a proper exercise of the police
power, and therefore, is not actionable as a matter of law. See, e.g., Cappture Realty
Corp. v. Board of Adjustment, 126 N.J. Super. 200, 313 A.2d 624 (L. Div. 1973); Dallas
v. Crownrich, 506 S.W. 2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). See generally, I R. ANDERSON,
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 5.15 (1968) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
9. 15 Cal. 3d at 510,542 P.2d at 239, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 367. The amendment designated
general developmental uses for the land in the area of plaintiff's property. The bulk of
the property was classified for low density residential use. Specific parcels were not
designated. The 1971 General Plan stated in part:
Changes in the land use element reflect the experiences and revised objectives of
the City. The major changes from the 1966 and 1969 plans consist of a decrease in
local shopping centers, an increase in regional shopping centers, an increase in the
size of single family lots, a re-evaluation of residential densities, and an increase in
park land. City of Cerritos, October 1971, General Plan Map, Chapter 4, Section
4.06.
Brief of Amici Curiae for the City of Cerritos, at 2, HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.
3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125 Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975).
10. 15 Cal. 3d at 511, 542 P.2d at 240, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
11. Id. The fourth quadrant of the intersection, located in La Palma, Cal., was also
zoned commercial. HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 908, 911, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 436, 439 (1974).
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leged that their property was not suited for single family residential
purposes,'2 and that the value of their property zoned commercial
would be $400,000, compared to $75,000 zoned residential. The trial
court sustained a demurrer without leave to amend to plaintiffs' cause
of action in inverse condemnation. 3 The district court of appeals held,
however, that plaintiffs had stated a cause of action by adequately
alleging the downzoning amounted to "taking or damaging" of private
property for public use which must be compensated. 14 The Supreme
Court of California reversed, holding that a zoning classification which
merely decreased the market value of property did not state a cause of
action in inverse condemnation. 5
Although a municipality's power to regulate land use is subject to
few restraints, 6 zoning regulations are often challenged 7 on the
ground that such actions result in an unconstitutional "taking"' 8 or
12. 41 Cal. App. 3d at 911, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 439 (1974). Plaintiffs alleged that the size,
shape, location and other physical factors relating to their property rendered it useless
for single family residential purposes. Id.
13. Plaintiffs sought review of the order in the appellate court and prayed for a writ of
mandate directing the trial court to overrule its demurrer. Id. at 910, 116 Cal. Rptr. at
438.
14. Id. at 916, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
15. 15 Cal. 3d at 515, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372.
16. See Euclid v. Ambler Reality Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (upholding zoning as a
valid exercise of the police power. See generally I ANDERSON, supra note 8, § 2.10.
Judicial deference is accorded to legislative determinations in the enactment of zoning
regulations, and an ordinance is upheld if there is any reasonable factual basis for it. See,
e.g., McCarthy v. City of Manhattan Beach, 41 Cal. 2d 879, 264 P.2d 932, cert. denied,
348 U.S. 817 (1953); Town of N. Redington Beach v. Williams, 220 So.2d 22 (Fla. App.
1969); Lubbock v. Whitacre, 414 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). See generally I
ANDERSON, supra 8, § 2.14.
17. The validity of a zoning regulation is most commonly tested by an action for a
declaratory judgment or an injunction, but a writ of mandamus may be used in an
appropriate case. See generally 3 ANDERSON, supra note 8, §§ 22.01-24.10.
Regardless of the procedure used to attack the zoning measure, there are many
substantive grounds on which to challenge the regulation. Ordinances have been held
invalid because the municipality lacked statutory enactment authority, Hinman v. Plan-
ning & Zoning Comm'n, 26 Conn. Supp. 125, 214 A.2d 131 (C.P. 1965); a procedural or
substantive requirement of the enabling statute was not observed, Bal Harbour Village v.
State, 299 So.2d 611 (Fla. App. 1974); it was void for vagueness, Taylor v. Moore, 303
Pa. 469, 154 A. 799 (1931); it lacked any reasonable relation to the police power, Young
Israel Organization v. Dworkin, 105 Ohio App. 89, 133 N.E. 2d 174 (1956); it was not
adopted in accordance with a comprehensive plan, Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs,
264 Or. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973) (minority view); and it constitutes illegal spot zoning,
Kissinger v. City of Los Angeles, 161 Cal. App. 2d 454, 327 P.2d 10 (1958).
18. The fifth amendment, made applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment, Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897), provides:
"... nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation."
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"damaging" 19 of property. When such claims are upheld, the courts
will either declare the regulations invalid and unenforceable or, under
special circumstances,20 award damages in an inverse condemnation
proceeding. 21
Inverse condemnation is a controversial theory of relief. An inverse
condemnation claimant alleges a deprivation of property without just
compensation. 22 Although the use of his land has been seriously im-
paired, the landowner has not been compensated because the land has
not been physically appropriated for public use. Since a private rather
than a public entity invokes the eminent domain clause, the cause of
action is termed "inverse. ' 23
In determining the applicability of the inverse condemnation doc-
trine to a particular case, a court will first examine the validity of the
U.S. CONST. amend. V. When a governmental body exercises its power of eminent
domain, it formally condemns the land prior to the taking and compensates the owner for
his loss through a condemnation decree. See generally, 2 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN
(3d rev. ed. 1963).
19. The California Constitution extends governmental liability to cases where private
property is "damaged" as well as "taken"for public use: "Private property shall not be
taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been made to...
the owner." CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19. See, e.g., Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal.
2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1965); Reardon v. City of San Francisco, 66 Cal.
492, 6 P. 317 (1885). The constitutions of 23 states require compensation to be paid the
owner for property that is damaged as well as taken for public use. See, e.g., ILL. CONST.
art. 1, § 15; Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 26; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10. See generally Note, Inverse
Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26
STAN. L. REV. 1439, 1440 n.3 (1974).
20. See notes 32-39 and accompanying text infra.
21. See Berger, A Policy Analysis of the Taking Problem, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 165
(1974).
22. See notes 18 & 19 supra.
23. Mandelker, Inverse Condemnation: The Constitutional Limits of Public Respon-
sibility, 1966 Wis. L. REV. 3, 4. There are four types of inverse condemnation actions,
each based on a particular combination of two variables: (1) the nature of the harm
caused by government action (either physical or nonphysical) and (2) the nature of the
government action causing the harm (either regulatory or nonregulatory). An action in
inverse condenmation will be permitted in instances of physical harm to property caused
by either regulatory or nonregulatory government action and nonphysical harm caused
by nonregulatory government action. E.g., Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 475
P.2d 441, 90 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1970) (physical harm caused by nonregulatory government
action); Albers v. County of Los Angeles, 62 Cal. 2d 250, 398 P.2d 129, 42 Cal. Rptr. 89
(1965); McMahon v. City of Telluride, 79 Colo. 281,244 P. 1017 (1926) (physical harm by
regulatory government action); Tamulion v. Michigan State Waterways Comm'n, 50
Mich. App. 60, 212 N.W.2d 828 (1973) (physical harm caused by non-regulatory govern-
ment action). See generally Van Alstyne, Modernizing Inverse Condemnation: A Legisla-
tive Prospectus, 8 SANTA CLARA LAw. 1, 5-7 (1967); Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its
Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, supra note 19.
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property interest alleged to have been taken.24 If no valid property right
is asserted, the regulation will be upheld since there has been no taking
or damaging of "property."25 If a valid property interest is at stake, the
court will then consider whether property has been taken or damaged.
The decisions on this point are somewhat inconsistent. 26 Generally,
when regulation results in physical invasion or loss of all beneficial use
of the property, compensation is awarded. 27 If the results are less
detrimental, a finding of taking or damaging is less certain. The courts
generally have not recognized inverse condemnation actions to com-
pensate for decreased property value resulting from restrictive land
use regulations, such as zoning ordinances or comprehensive city
plans.28 Relief has been denied to plaintiffs, for example, in cases in
which zoning authorities have downzoned property from a commercial
to a flood plain classification; 29 limited property use to open space; 0
24. D. MANDELKER, MANAGING OUR URBAN ENVIRONMENT 622 (2d ed. 1971).
25. For example, regulation of a noxious use has been upheld because there is no
property right to maintain a nuisance. See, e.g., Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
See generally D. HAGMAN, URBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT CONTROL LAW, §
180 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HAGMAN).
26. Commentators have advanced different theories to determine when government
action relating to private property requires compensation to the owner. See Berger,
supra note 21; Binder, Taking Versus Reasonable Regulation: A Reappraisal in Light of
Regional Planning and Wetlands, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 1 (1972); Costonis, Development
Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973); Large, This Land is
Whose Land? Changing Concepts of Land as Property, 1973 Wis. L. REV. 1039; Man-
delker, supra note 23; Michelman, Property, Utility and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation"Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967); Van
Alstyne, supra note 23; Van Alstyne, Taking or Damaging by Police Power: The Search
for Inverse Condemnation Criteria, 44 S. CALIF. L. REV. 1 (1970); Waite, Governmental
Power and Private Property, 16 CATH. U.L. REV. 283 (1966); Comment, An Evaluation of
the Rights and Remedies of a New York Landowner for Losses Due to Government
Action-With a Proposal For Reform, 33 ALB. L. REV. 537 (1968).
27. HAGMAN. supra note 25, § 179.
28. See, e.g., Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Beunaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d
111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973); Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 127
Cal. Rptr. 520 (1976) (court sustained demurrer to plaintiffs' inverse condemnation
action in which plaintiffs alleged that amendment to city's general plan limiting their
property to open space use damaged their right to use and enjoyment in the amount of
$1,500,000); Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So.2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1973), cer denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Gaebel v. Thornbury Twp., 8 Pa. Commw.
Ct. 399, 303 A.2d 57 (1973). Accord, Turner v. County of Del Norte, 24 Cal. App. 3d 311,
101 Cal. Rptr. 93 (1972). Cf. Veling v. Borough of Ramsey, 94 N.J. Super. 459,228 A.2d
873 (App. Div. 1967) (inverse condemnation action may not be brought against munici-
pality for damages for loss of use of property in accordance with original valid zoning
ordinance during pendency of amendments to the zoning ordinance which were subse-
quently found invalid).
29. Gaebel v. Thornbury Twp., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 399, 303 A.2d 57 (1973).
30. Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal. App. 3d 101, 127 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1976).
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and reduced permissible density for development purposes after a
more intensive development had been planned and allowed under the
prior ordinance. 31
Despite the general reluctance to allow inverse condemnation ac-
tions, if other factors are present, 32 recovery for decreased property
value is sometimes permitted. California courts have allowed inverse
condemnation actions for damages resulting from restrictive zoning
coupled with municipal plans for future acquisition of the property;33
municipal plans to circumvent acquiring title;34 or municipal confisca-
tory action.35 In Peacock v. County of Sacramento,36 the county se-
verely restricted use of property located at the end of an airport
runway. The court had informed the landowner to its intent to acquire
the property for the airport but renounced this intent after five years of
denying the owner virtually any development of his land. The court
appeals held that these extraordinary circumstances warranted relief in
inverse condemnation. 37 Sneed v. County of Riverside38 involved
municipal plans to circumvent acquiring title. The county zoning regu-
lation in Sneed established height restrictions on the plaintiff's proper-
ty for the purpose of acquiring structure-free approaches to a nearby
airport without acquiring land for an air navigation easement. Flights
were operated over plaintiff's property. The court of appeals held
plaintiff stated a cause of action in inverse condemnation. 39
31. Mailman Dev. Corp. v. City of Hollywood, 286 So.2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974).
32. When restrictive zoning has been coupled with the following special circumst-
ances inverse condemnation actions for damages have been upheld: (I) municipal plans
for future acquisition of th erty, e.g., Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App.
2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 (1969); accord. Arastra Ltd. v. City of Palo Alto, 401 F. Supp.
962 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Dahl v. City of Palo Alto, 372 F. Supp. 647 (N.D. Cal. 1974); (2)
municipal plans to circumvent acquiring title, e.g., Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218
Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963); (3) confiscatory action, e.g., Eldridge v. City
of Palo Alto, 5 Cal. App. 3d 726, 124 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1975) (landowner whose property
was zoned permanent open space and conservation land allowed to maintain inverse
condemnation action).
33. See, e.g., Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr.
391 (1969).
34. See, e.g., Sneed v. County of Riverside, 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318
(1963).
35. See, e.g., Eldridge v. City of Palo Alto, 51 Cal. App. 3d 726, 124 Cal. Rptr. 547
(1975).
36. 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr, 391 (1969).
37. Id. at 864, 77 Cal. Rptr. at 404.
38. 218 Cal. App. 2d 205, 32 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963).
39. Id. at 209, 32 Cal. Rptr. at 320.
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In the absence of the special circumstances noted above, however,
California courts have refused to allow inverse condemnation actions
to challenge zoning regulations. In Selby Realty Co. v. City of San
Buenaventura4" the California Supreme Court held that the adoption of
a general plan did not constitute a taking of plaintiff's property and
refused to allow a cause of action in inverse condemnation. 41 Similarly,
in Morse v. County of San Luis Obispo,42 the court held a downzoning
of plaintiff's property did not give rise to an inverse condemnation
action.43
In HFH, plaintiffs advanced several arguments to persuade the
court to allow an inverse condemnation action to challenge the zoning
classification. Relying on the weight of precendent, the court rejected
plaintiffs' contention that merely showing a diminution in property
value was sufficient to maintain an inverse condemnation action. 44 The
40. 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
41. Id. at 127, 128, 514 P.2d at 122, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 810. In Shelby, the City of San
Buenaventura and the County of Ventura had adopted a comprehensive general plan
which provided a public street extension to cross plaintiff's land. Plaintiff refused to
dedicate a portion for the proposed street and unsuccessfully sought a building permit to
construct an apartment building on the property. Plaintiff filed an action for declaratory
relief, damages in inverse condemnation, and writ of mandamum against the city and
county. The court affirmed a demurrer to the inverse condemnation cause of action:
[I]nsofar as this cause of action is based upon the adoption of a general plan' there
is no "taking" of the property. Nor is a cause of action in inverse condemnation
stated for the denial of a building permit. The gravamen of plaintiff's complaint is
that the city refused to issue the permit unless plaintiff complied with an assertedly
invalid condition. The appropriate method by which to consider such a claim is by a
proceeding in mandamus ....
Id.
42. 247 Cal. App. 2d 600, 55 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1967).
43. Id. at 602-03, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 712. In Morse, the court reasoned:
Plaintiffs are apparently attempting to recover profits they might have earned if
they had been successful in getting their land rezoned to permit subdivision into
small residential lots, but landowners have no vested right in existing or anticipated
zoning ordinances. . . .A purchaser of land merely acquires a right to continue a
use instituted before the enactment of a more restrictive zoning. Public entities are
not bound to reimburse individuals for losses due to changes in zoning, for within
the limits of the police power "some uncompensated hardships must be borne by
individuals as the price of living in a modern, enlightened and progressive commun-
ity." (Metro Realty v. County of El Dorado, 222 Cal. App. 2d 508, 518, 35 Cal.
Rptr. 480, 486.)
Id.
44. 15 Cal. 3d at 513-18, 542 P.2d at 240-44, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 368-72. Besides relying
on Selby and Morse, see notes 40-43 and accompanying text supra, the court cited State
v. Superior Court (Veta), 12 Cal. 3d 237, 524 P.2d 1281, 115 Cal. Rptr. 497 (1974); Gisler
v. County of Madera, 38 Cal. App. 2d 126, 52 Cal. Rptr. 292 (1966).
The concept of diminution of value as a measure for determining when a regulation
became a "taking", originated in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
Under this approach, courts determined the degree to which the owner's profit from his
1977]
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court refused to construe the state constitution's "just compensation"
clause broadly enough to permit relief. 45 The court characterized zon-
ing as regulation which confers reciprocal benefits and burdens, the
purpose of which is neither to appropriate property for public use nor
to provide economic gain for specific property owners.46 Plaintiffs, the
court asserted, did not object to and were willing to reap the benefits
from the residential zoning imposed on other property near their pro-
posed shopping center (supplying it with a ready market of consum-
ers). But when the less intensive use classification was applied to their
property, conferring burdens on them and benefits on other members
of the community, plaintiffs sought to declare such zoning invalid and
prevent its enforcement.47
Reliance on the theory of reciprocity to justify restrictive zoning
does not, however, confront the problem of the unequal benefits and
burdens which the regulation creates. Reciprocity may produce dra-
matic and devastating effects in the form of windfalls and wipeouts.48
property was impaired by the imposition of the regulation. Severel ive regulations were
generally held invalid. No specific percentage of market value decline was necessary
before a regulation was held a taking of property, but it was generally recognized that
when the private property became completely or substantially worthless, relief was
required. See, e.g., Skalko v. City of Sunnyvale, 14 Cal. 2d 213, 93 P.2d 93 (1939);
Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E. 2d 587 (1938). See also
Large, supra note 26; Waite, supra note 26; Comment, An Evaluation of the Rights and
Remedies of a New York Landowner for Losses Due to Government Action-With a
Proposal for Reform, supra note 26.
Plaintiffs attempted to distinguish Selby by contrasting their allegedly discriminatory
zoning classification with the uniformly applied zoning classification imposed in Selby.
The court responded, however, that if discriminatory zoning was plaintiff's complaint,
the proper action was a proceeding in mandamus, not inverse condemnation. Adminis-
trative action which is improper or an abuse of discretion is attacked by a mandate
proceeding. Selby Realty Co. v. City of Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109
Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973). See generally 3 ANDERSON, supra note 8, § 22.09.
45. 15 Cal. 3d at 518, 542 P.2d at 244, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 372. The suggested interpreta-
tion was that the California constitutional provision forbidding private property to be
"taken or damaged" without payment of just compensation (CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 19)
was intended to cover instances of harsh regulation such as the downzoning present in
HFH. 15 Cal. 3d at 518, 542 P.2d at 244, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372. The court relied on its
explanation in Holtz v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 296, 310, 475 P.2d 441, 450, 90 Cal.
Rptr. 345, 354 (1970), that although the property owner would be protected against
physical damage proximately resulting from a public improvement, "[n]o California case
has ever interpreted the 'or damaged' phrase of our state Constitution to cover mere
diminution of market value of property." 15 Cal. 3d at 518 n. 15, 542 P.2d at 244 n. 15, 125
Cal. Rptr. at 372 n.15.
46. 15 Cal. 3d at 517, 542 P.2d at 246, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374.
47. Id.
48. See note 3 supra. See also Bagne, Up and Down the Zoning Scale, 26 LAND USE
L. & ZONING DIo. No. 11, at 6 (1974); Costonis, The Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and
the Preservation of Urban Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574 (1972); Costonis, supra
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In HFH plaintiffs' property was downzoned to residential use while
the three other corner lots remained commercially zoned. Attempting
to meet these circumstances head-on, plaintiffs' amici curiae ad-
vanced a novel theory of relief which would permit the adversely
affected landowner to recover damages through inverse condemna-
tion and thereby mitigate his loss. 49 Plaintiffs argued that the court
should consider the "fairness" of the effect of the challenged zoning
classification. Fairness, plaintiffs asserted, the principle reflected in
the compensation clauses of the state and federal constitutions, re-
quired that plaintiffs be allowed to pursue their action for damages.
50
note 26; Michelman, supra note 26; Rose, A Proposalfor the Separation and Marketabil-
ity of Development Rights as a Technique to Preserve Open Space, 2 REAL EST. L.J. 635
(1974); Waite, supra note 26.
49. Alternative means of compensating the property owner who is wiped out by a
downzoning should be considered since he may be foreclosed from seeking damages in
inverse condemnation. Suggested alternatives include: development rights trasfers, de-
nsity transfers, zoning by special assessment funded eminent domain, development
rights insurance, land value increment taxes, excess condemnation, recapture taxes on
public improvements, and "fair" compensation throuth the accomodation power. See
Bagne, supra note 48; Berger, supera- supra note 21; Costonis, "Fair" Compensation
and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Con-
troversies, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1021 (1975); Costonis, supra note 26; Hagman, supra note
3; Rose, supra note 48; Waite, supra note 26.
50. 15 Cal. 3d at 520, 542 P.2d at 245, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 373. Plaintiffs cited County of
San Diego v. Miller, 13 Cal. 3d 684, 532 P.2d 139, 119 Cal. Rptr. 491 (1975) in support of
their fairness contention. In Miller, the Supreme Court of California held that the holder
of an unexercised option to purchase property supported by consideration had an
interest for which he was constitutionally entitled to compensation when the property
was later condemned. Id. at 693, 532 P.2d at 144, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 496. The court noted
that, although the holder of an unexercised option had no common law estate in the land,
'compensation issues should be decided on considerations of fairness and public poli-
cy." Id. at 691, 532 P.2d at 143, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 495. The court in HFH considered
Miller inapplicable, stating that "the issue to that case was the distribution of a condem-
nation award which all conceded to be appropriate, not whether otherwise lawful state
action constituted a 'taking.' " 15 Cal. 3d at 520 n. 17, 542 P.2d at 245 n. 17, 125 Cal. Rptr.
at 372 n. 17. The court remained mindful of principles of fairness, citing United States v.
Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973), ("The constitutional requirement of just compensation
derives as much content from the basic equitable principles of fairness . . . as it does
from technical concepts of property law."), but concluded that equity did not require
relief under these facts. 15 Cal. 3d at 520 n. 17, 542 P.2d at 245 n. 17, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372
n.17.
The fairness argument considers the reliance of the property owner on the previous
zoning classification and his reasonable expectations. The HFH court maintained plain-
tiffs' expectations regarding their property were not reasonable since they failed to
recognize the possibility that their property would be rezoned. Thus HFH precludes the
use of inverse condemnation to protect expectations in such circumstances.
Alternative means may provide protection. See note 49 supra. If a landowner has
obtained a building permit or begun construction before downzoning, the doctrine of
estoppel would prevent enforcement of the zoning change. Estoppel protects the land-
owner who has a vested right in the property and has been detrimentally affected by
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The court rejected this theory on the grounds of policy and a belief that
a legislative rather than a judicially devised remedy was more appro-
priate. The court concluded that the result advocated by plaintiffs was
beyond the court's remedial power. Compensation of property owners
for market value diminution resulting from zoning would require legis-
lative reform to implement and considerable administrative machinery
to enforce. 51
acting in reliance on a municipality's affirmative act. The landowner is said to have
acquired a vested right to continue the development and use of his property when that
development has reached a certain point. Whether that necessary point has been reached
depends on such factors as the land owner's receipt of administrative permission to
develop the property (i.e., a building permit), his expenditures in reliance on the adminis-
trative permission, and his change of position in relation to the property. But neither acts
of previous zoning nor expenditure of money on the property alone will necessarily
confer vested rights. See, e.g., Strong v. County of Santa Cruz, 45 Cal. App.3d 355, 119
Cal. Rptr. 362 (1975); Whitfield v. Seabrook, 259 S.C. 66, 190 S.E.2d 743 (1972). But see
Town of Largo v. Imperial Homes Corp., 309 So.2d 571 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (where
town approved developer's request to re-zone property for high rise apartment develop-
ment and knew developer spent over $379,000 for land and development, town was
estopped from downzoning the property to prevent apartment development; building
permit not a requirement for invoking equitable estoppel). See generally HAGMAN, supra
note 25, § 99; Bagne, supra note 48, at 6; Cable & Hauck, The Property Owner' forming
Uses and Vested Rights, 10 WILLAMETrE L.J. 404 (1974); Heeter, Zoning Estoppel:
Application of the Principles of Equitable Estoppel and Vested Rights to Zoning Dis-
putes, 1971 URBAN L. ANN. 63.
The doctrine of non-conforming uses provides that a use may continue if it lawfully
pre-exists the adoption of a zoning ordinance that subsequently prohibits that use. The
doctrine may protect a completed development. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Los Angeles,
211 Cal. 304, 295 P. 14 (1930), Dingeman Advertising Inc. v. Algoma Twp., 393 Mich. 89,
223 N.W.2d 689 (1974). See also HAGMAN, supra note 25, § 80; Cable & Hauck, supra, at
408.
HFH leaves open the possibility of allowing inverse condemnation where the chal-
lenged regulation seeks to terminate an existing use.
Thus we need not here consider the question of a nonconforming use which the
zoning authority seeks to terminate or remove; for plaintiffs have alleged that they
enjoy a vested right, not in an existing use, but in a mere zoning classification on
vacant land. This case therefore raises no issue of the constitutionality of a zoning
regulation which requires the termination of an existing use.
15 Cal. 3d at 513 n.12, 542 P.2d at 242 n.12, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 370 n.12.
51. 15 Cal. 3d at 518, 542 P.2d at 250, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 375. The HFH court's
recognition of the need for legislative attention is a step in the right direction.
We are urged in this case to redefine the state and federal constitutional require-
ments of just compensation and to require payment for any zoning action when
results in the diminution of market value. That we do not do so reflects less our
belief that no problems exist with the present law in this area than our conviction
that legislative rather than judicial action holds the key to any useful reform.
Id. at 517-18, 542 P.2d at 246-47, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374-75. See also Van Alstyne, supra
note 23, at 68.
The legislature must comprehensively evaluate the appropriateness of inverse con-
demnation to challange zoning actions. Arguably a statutory scheme which permits
inverse condemnation proceedings to protect victims of wipeouts would require those
property owners reaping a windfall from zoning action to pay the government the
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The court also determined that in view of the nature of urban
planning and the history of the subject property, the foreseeabilty of
rezoning was, or should have been, evident to the property owners.
The court intimated that had the plaintiffs discounted the value of their
property by the probability of downzoning and originally paid that
price, no redistribution of land values would have been effected or
imposed. 52 Plaintiffs had speculated against the system and lost.
The dissent, however, viewed the question of compensation as one
turning on considerations of fairness. 53 The dissent argued that the
state constitution "damage" provision should be construed to allow
compensation for governmental downzoning provided: (1) governmen-
tal action results in substantial decrease in value of the property; (2)
the decrease is of long or potentially infinite duration; and (3) the
owner incurs more than his share of the financial burden.54 Applying
this test to the facts in HFH, the dissent concluded that plaintiffs had
stated a valid cause of action in inverse condemnation. 55
increased value of their property in order to balance the equities. Redistribution would
be achieved through government compensation of the wipeout victim. Various theories
and methods of redistribution have been proposed. See generally notes 48, 49 supra.
52. 15 Cal. 3d at 513, 542 P.2d at 246, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 374, citing Michelman, supra
note 26, at 1238. See also Berger, supra note 21, at 195-96.
53. 15 Cal. 3d at 517, 542 P.2d at 248, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 376 (Clark, J., dissenting). The
dissent relied on County of San Diego v. Miller, 13 Cal. 3d 684, 532 P.2d 139, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 491 (1975) (See discussion of case in note 50 supra) and Southern Cal. Edison Co.
v. Bourgerie, 9 Cal. 3d 169, 507 P.2d 964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973). In Bourgerie
defendant landowners had acquired property subject to the restriction that neither the
property itself nor adjacent property could be used for an electric transmission station.
When plaintiff public utility condemned property adjacent to defendant's property, the
court held defendants were entitled to compensation, citing the salutary principle of
compensation based on fairness. Id. at 175, 507 P.2d at 968, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The
dissent in HFH also cited Muskopf v. Coming Hosp. Dist., 58 Cal. 2d 211,359 P.2d 457,
11 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1961) (hospital tort case rejecting doctrine of governmental tort
immunity as mistaken and unjust) to support the proposition that fairness should be
applied in all instances of loss suffered as a result of governmental action. 15 Cal. 3d at
525, 542 P.2d at 249, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
54. 15 Cal. 3d at 526, 542 P.2d at 250, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 378.
55. Id. The dissent reasoned that an 80% decrease in value of plaintiffs' land was
clearly substantial; the decrease was of long duration since it arose as part of a com-
prehensive, long-term general plan passed pursuant to state law; and plaintiff's share of
the burden was unfairly excessive because their property was the only quadrant of the
intersection which was not zoned commercial. See note 11 and accompanying text
supra.
It has been contended, however, that inverse condemnation would be an inappropriate
remedy because it lacks support in the case law, does not have doctrinal justification, is
not necessary because of other available equitable remedies, and is disfavored by strong
policy reasons in fiscal management and planning. See Note, Inverse Condemnation: Its
Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, supra note 19. The
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In the final analysis, the HFH decision adds support to the view that
a property owner whose land is merely downzoned56 is not constitu-
tionally required to be compensated. Nevertheless, the court suggested
that factual situations incorporating a downzoning "plus" are not
precluded from raising a cause of action in inverse condemnation.
5 7
authors state that there is no doctrinal justification for the extension. Id. at 1445-46. An
aggrieved landowner should not have the option of converting an invalid governmental
exercise of the police power into a valid comparable governmental act sustainable under
the different power of eminent domain. The authors also state that cases which allow
inverse condemnation typically involve physical damage or non-regulatory government
action, with only a few distinguishable exceptions. Id. at 1447. In cases of actual
physical damage to property, compensation must be granted because stopping the
injurious activity would not restore the property to the status quo and the landowner
must have relief from the damage already suffered. The nonregulatory cases allowed
inverse condemnation because the societal interest in continuing the governmental
activity is greater than the interest in enjoining it. It is more desirable to compensate a
property owner for his land to make possible the construction of a highway than not to
construct the highway at all. Several policy reasons have been advanced: allowing
inverse condemnation to challenge land use controls will inhibit government planning
because planners will be threatened with possible liability with every action they take;
allowing the land owner to choose between injunctive relief and compensation takes the
control over allocation of resources away from the legislature; and the injury is similr to
that suffered in other torts for which the municipality would not be liable. Id. at 1450.
See Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Damages-A New Cause of Action, 5 URBAN
LAW. 15 (1973).
Proponents of statutory recognition of such suits, nevertheless, base their position on
opposing policy views and case support. The primary reason advanced for allowing
inverse condemnation actions is that it wold lead to more careful planning by officials.
Three courts have suggested the landowner should have the option of suing for damages:
State Rd. Dep't v. Tharp, 146 Fla. 745, 1 So.2d 868 (1941); Keck v. Haley, 237 S.W.2d
527 (Ky. 1951); Chase v. Ciuty of Glen Cove, 34 Misc. 2d 810, 227 N.Y.S.2d 131 (Sup.
Ct. 1962). One court has ignored a landowner's request for injunction and has required
compensation: Lomarch Corp. v. City of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 (1968).
See Badler, supra, at 49-50; Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police
Power and Eminent Domain by the Courts: So Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation,
1968 URBAN L. ANN. 1, Note, Inverse Condemnation: The Case for Diminution in
Property Value as Compensable Damage, 28 STAN L. REV., 779 (1976), Note, Inverse
Condemnation: Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, supra,
note 19.
56. It has been suggested that the court's characterization of the "mere diminution in
value" at stake seems to overlook the 80% loss in market value plaintiffs suffer, the
evidence of spot zoning, inconsistency with general plans, disregard of extrateorritorial
factors and equal protection problems arising from the contemporaneous zoning of
nearby parcels for commerical use. See Hagman, The Taking Issue: The HFH et al.,
Round, 28 LAND USE L. & ZONING DIG. No. 2 (1976) at 5.
57. The court notes: "This case does not present, and we therefore do not decide, the
question of entitlement to compensation in the event a zoning regulation forbade sub-
stantially all use of the land in question. We have the question for another day." 15
Cal.3d at 515 n.16, 542 P.2d at 244 n.16, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 372 n.16. Thus, when the
downzoning is accompanied by factors of future acquisition plans, plans to circumvent
acquiring title, confiscatory action, pre-existing use rights, or vested rights in the form of
administrative permits, recovery remains possible. See discussion of cases cited in notes
32-39 supra.
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Land traditionally has been exploited on the basis of its highest and
best use,5" but it is also a resource which requires continuous manage-
ment, in the course of which local governments will inevitably down-
zone particular property. HFH relieves communities of some fiscal
constraint which would otherwise seriously hamper their planning
efforts59 without entirely foreclosing the property owner from remedy.
Melinda Northrup
58. See Costonis, "Fair" Compensation and the Accommodation Power: Antidotes
for the Taking Impasse in Land Use Controversies, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1021 (1975).
59. The possible chilling effect of extending inverse condemnation to zoning actions
and paying dmages with public funds is very real, as evidenced by the claims existing
against many cities. Among them are claims in inverse condemnation for approximately
$85 million against Fremont, Cal., based on its general plan and for over $40 million
against Palo Alto, Cal., for rezoning to less dense uses. Brief of Amici Curiae for the
City of Cerritos at 25, HFH, Ltd. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 508, 542 P.2d 237, 125
Cal. Rptr. 365 (1975). But cf. San Antonio River Auth. v. Garret Bros., 528 S.W.2d 266
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975) (allowing subdivider to recover damages for government refusal to
issue permits for sewer and water connections, stating that to do so would not transform
government into inactive body fearful of liability and financial disaster; there were,
however, elements of improper acquisitory motives on the municipality's part). See also
Beuscher, supra note 55; Cabaniss, Inverse Condemnation in Texas-Exploring the
Serbonian Bog, 44 TEX. L. REV. 1584 (1966).
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